Essentially all the proposals will provide REAL telephone number (TN) of which either IP or URI will ride on. So that means the responsiblity to verify the deaf/hon rests on VRS or IP providers. There are different ways to verify; one of verification procedure is via post card to the physical address and ask the person to use info on post card to either call or email or log in. This is just one example. Also, firewalls will be at the VRS providers so they can help protect y’all. Bottom line is as u said security needs to be where deaf/hon are comfortable with.

Ed

If I understand the proposals especially the NeuStar and Dash right. VRS providers will be able to offer features that you mentioned. We deaf and hoh will be able to choose VRS providers on the basis of features offered.

On the telemarketeer. It is going to be an issue. Even though, Ten Digit Phone Number will greatly minimize the scammed calls, many businesses because they have been “burned” by the scammers, will still hang up on ANY relay calls. So what is needed? Probably massive advertising to business that because of new TN, scammers will be minimized will need to be done. Also, maybe educate deaf/hoh on how to utilize VRS or IP by using different kind of announcement; example: First tell Relay Operator or Video Interpreter NOT to announce standard introduction, instead use my announcement “Hi this is Ed Bosson calling you through xyzVRS. May I speak to a person knowledgeable about light and tough tent?” Or Or maybe not even use xyzvrs if u get a very good video interpreter.

Ed B
RT Administrator

One great way to verify caller is to use something called client verification that is part of HTTPS protocol. A caller could go to a VRS site to sign up where caller will receive a certificate assigned to the caller. This certificate is then installed on caller’s computer in the store (for example Key Chain in OS X or Certificate Store in Windows) where the browser can load it when VRS web server requests for one. If a scam call is made, VRS will know exactly who did it by checking the certificate used. But of course this depends on how VRS verifies the caller’s identity in the first place!

Always remember, security is as strong as the weakest link. Also obscurity is not security

As a bonus to certificates, all VRS could be using a common trusted certificate service to create caller certificates. This means certificate created by one VRS is easily usable by other VRS-es. Tons of information can be inserted into certificate such as caller’s phone number.

bob

It is good to see you in return from the hiatus. Congratulations on your receiving the honorary degree from Gallaudet University last month!

I would love to use this system to identify the caller ID, preventable from the scammers, and direct call for hearing people to contact me. To my knowledge, CSDVRS and IP-Relay provided me these numbers for hearing people to call me. Some people hung on me because they believe the VRS that are such as telemarketers. I understand Sorenson add new feature for direct call. Do you know any of these VRS outlets that provide the same approaches?

Nick Vera

Good Comments. Good rationale. Good safeguards. However, I am apprehensive of being in a position to select which is the best solution simply because I dont have the expertise, knowledge, and access to all information. Are these proposals exposing ALL information? Is there any hidden agenda among these proposals that we, inexperienced people, should be aware of before casting our preferences.

For example, are all car owners familiar with the engines? How many gallons of gas in tank? How many cylinders? Impact of cylinders on performances?

Because of these unanswered questions, we, the consumers, should tell the FCC what we, the consumers, want as consumers.

We need to remember that, in this setting, there is an extremely unusual situation that needs to be looked into before any decision is to be made. All videophones are being made by VRS providers. Let me repeat…VRS providers manufacture their own videophones. Videophones are being programmed by VRS companies.

For example, all VP100 and VP200 have SVRS in the listing and it cannot be removed. It is on the top of the contact list. It cannot be lowered. It has an icon on the main menu. It cannot be removed.

Should SVRS be authorized to provide numbers and customers want to switch to another VRS, how will this be done without wasting time and energy by trying to bypass the VRS provider’s manufactured restrictions?

Have these proposals proposed solutions to these issues above?

In closing, we, the consumers, as Ed would say, need to keep our eyes OPEN…proactively!

Sonny